Abstract-In this paper we consider a wiretap channel with a secret key buffer. We use the coding scheme of [1] to enhance the secrecy rate to the capacity of the main channel, while storing each securely transmitted message in the secret key buffer. We use the oldest secret bits from the buffer to be used as a secret key to transmit a message in a slot and then remove those bits. With this scheme we are able to prove stronger results than those in [1]. i.e., not only the message which is being transmitted currently, but all the messages transmitted in last N1 slots are secure with respect to all the information that the eavesdropper possesses, where N1 can be chosen arbitrarily large.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wyner's seminal paper on wiretap channel [2] provided a coding scheme for achieving secrecy capacity for a degraded wiretap channel, i.e., when Eavesdropper's (Eve's) channel is degraded with respect to (w.r.t.) the main receiver's channel. If the main channel capacity is C and Eve's channel capacity is C e , then Wyner proved that secrecy capcity is C s = C − C e . Thus there can be a substantial loss of rate due to the security constraint. More generally, a Broadcast channel with confidential messages was studies in [3] , where Eve's channel is not assumed to be degraded. In [3] , the authors have also shown the trade-off between secrecy and the achievable rate.
One way to overcome the rate loss is to use some shared secret key with rate R K . Then the achievable secrecy rate is min {C m , (C m − C e + R K ) + } (Chapter 17, [4] ). The first work on secret key generation is reported in [5] . In this paper the authors assume a public discussion channel for exchanging functions, and then to agree on a key. The eavesdropper "hears" the whole conversation. [6] discusses two types of models: Source type model and Channel type model. Secret key generation via the sources and channels was investigated in [7] and [8] and for multiple terminals in [9] .
Wiretap channel with rate-distortion has been studied in [10] .
Another technique to enhance the secrecy rate is the use of feedback as in [11] where the authors have considered the wiretap channel with secure rate limited feedback. This feedback is used to agree on a secret key. Wiretap channel with shared key was studied in [12] .
Recently, a multiplex coding based wiretap coding scheme is proposed which also achieves secrecy rate equal to the main channel capacity [13] . In this work, as in [1] , the authors have shown that each individual message is secure w.r.t. Eve's output. The coding schemes in [13] and [1] are different.
A slow fading wiretap channel with a secret key buffer was studied in [14] . The authors study the scenario where different secret messages are being transmitted in different slots and consider the equivocation of a message with the outputs of the channel to the eavesdropper in the same slot. In [15] the authors compute the equivocation of all messages with the outputs of the channel to the eavesdropper in all these slots. In this paper the authors have used a secret key buffer to leverage the secrecy capacity, i.e., when the main channel is worse than Eve's channel, secret key bits are used from the buffer to transmit a message using a one time pad scheme. The authors are not enhancing secrecy rate, rather they are trying to nullify the fluctuation in secrecy capacity.
Strong secrecy based secret key agreement was introduced in [16] . For a detailed survey of Information theoretic security reader can refer to [17] .
In this paper we do not assume any public channel or feedback. As in [1] , we use previous messages (which are transmitted securely) as key and also use wiretap coding, in a single slot to enhance the secrecy rate. After a finite number of slots we can achieve secrecy rate equal to the main channel capacity. Our scheme is much simpler than multiplex coding technique proposed in [13] . Also, unlike in [13] and [1] , we show that at any time k, all messages transmitted in previous N 1 slots are securely transmitted while attaining secrecy rate equal to the main channel capacity. The N 1 can be taken as large as we wish. To do this, we use a secret key buffer, as in [15] but with the coding, decoding scheme of [1] . But unlike in [15] we increase secrecy capacity to Shannon capacity of the main channel and unlike in [1] we consider mutual information between all the messages transmitted in recent past with respect to all the data received by Eavesdropper.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In Section II we present the system model and the coding/decoding scheme. In Section III we state the main theorem with proof. The paper concludes in Section IV. The proof of the two lemma's used in the proof of the theorem is provided in an appendix.
A note about the notation: capital letters, like W will denote a random variable and the corresponding small letter w its realization. An n-length vector (A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n ) will be Information theoretic notation will be same as in [4] .
II. CHANNEL MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider a discrete time, memoryless, degraded wiretap channel, where Alice wants to transmit messages to Bob. There is an eavesdropper (Eve) who is passively "listening" (Fig. 1) . We want to keep Eve ignorant of the messages.
Formally, Alice wants to communicate messages W ∈ W = {1, 2, . . . , 2 nRs } reliably over the Wiretap channel to Bob, while ensuring that Eve is not able to decode them. Here R s is the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel defined as
We assume R s > 0. The transition probability matrix of the channel is p(y, z|x). At time i, X i is the channel input and the legitimate receiver (Bob) and Eve receive the channel outputs Y i and Z i respectively, where
The messages W m are generated uniformly from W and {W m , m ≥ 1} is an independent sequence. One or more messages are encoded into an n length codeword. A minislot consists of n channel uses. In our scheme, the first slot consists of only one mini-slot. From next slot onwards a slot has (M + 1) minislots where M is a large positive integer. Let C be the capacity of Alice-Bob channel and [x] denote the integer part of x. For simplicity, we take C Rs as integer. The message W k to be transmitted in slot k consists of one or more messages W m . The codeword for message W k is denoted by X k . The corresponding received bits by Eve are Z k . To increase the secrecy rate, the transmitter uses previous messages as the key for transmitting the message in a later slot.
The message W k transmitted in slot k is stored as key in a key buffer (of infinite length) for later use. After certain bits from the key buffer are used as a key for data transmission, those bits are discarded from the key buffer not to be used again. Let B k be the number of bits in the key buffer at the beginning of slot k. Let R k be the number of key bits used in slot k from the key buffer. Then
where |W k | denotes the number of bits in W k . Now we explain the coding-decoding scheme used in this paper.
A. Encoder:
To transmit message W k in slot k, the encoder has two parts
where X ∈ X , and K is the set of secret keys generated and f s is the wiretap encoder, as in [2] . For f d one can use various encoders studied for transmission with secret key. We use the following: Take binary version of the message and XOR with the binary version of the key. Encode the resulting encrypted message with an optimal usual channel encoder. Assume that the key buffer at time 0 is empty. In the first slot a message encoded using the wiretap coding only is transmitted. 
) an extra message from the source stream is transmitted (thus in slot k, k messages are transmitted, (k − 1)R s n bits from the key buffer are removed in the beginning of slot k and kR s n bits are added to the key buffer at the end of slot k). This continues till slot M + 1. From slot M + 1 onwards M + 1 messages are transmitted in the above mentioned fashion. We use the key buffer as a first in first out (FIFO) queue, i.e., at any time the oldest key bits in the buffer are used first. Also B k → ∞ as k → ∞. Since we cannot transmit at a rate higher than Bob's capacity C, the maximum number of messages that can be transmitted in a slot is 1 + C Rs M (this is because in the first minislot using wiretap coding we can transmit only at rate R s and in the rest of the M minislots at most at rate C). Once we reach this limit, from then onwards 1 + C Rs M messages will be transmitted in a slot. Thus the maximum secrecy rate achievable in a slot via our codingdecoding scheme is Rs+CM M+1 which can be made as close to C as we wish by making M arbitrarily large.
Decoder
For decoding at Bob, in slot 1 the usual wiretap decoder is used (say joint-typicality decoder). From slot 2 onwards, for the first minislot, we use the wiretap decoder while for rest of the minislots, we use the channel decoder (corresponding to the channel encoder used) and then XOR the decoded message with the key used.
We will denote by P n e the probability that any of the message transmitted in a slot is not received properly by Bob: 
. . , Z k ) → 0 as n → ∞, for all k ≥ 1. Our current criterion for secrecy is stronger:
III. CAPACITY OF WIRETAP CHANNEL Theorem 3.1: The secrecy capacity of our coding-decoding scheme is C for all k large enough. Proof : As mentioned in the last section, by using our codingdecoding scheme, using wiretap coding and secure key, in any slot k Bob is able to decode the message W k with probability P n e → 0 as n → ∞. Also, it is shown in [1] , as our coding scheme satisfies the properties needed in [1] , we can show that
as n → ∞. Since the key buffer B k → ∞, we use the oldest key bits in the buffer first and in any slot do not use more than M C Rs key bits, after sometime (say N 2 slots) for all k ≥ N 2 we will be using key bits only from the messages W 1 , W 2 , . . . , W k−N1−1 for messages (W k , W k−1 , . . . , W k−N1 . For any ǫ > 0 (due to wiretap coding), we can choose n such that I(W k,1 ; Z k,1 ) ≤ nǫ for all k ≥ 1. Also,
We show in Lemma 1 that
and in Lemma 2 that
From (7), (8) and (6) 
By fixing N 1 , we can take ǫ small enough that N 1 ǫ is less than any desired value. Comment 1: So far we have been considering an infinite buffer system. But an actual system will have a finite buffer. Now we compute the key buffer length needed for our system. If we fix the probability of error for Bob and the upper bound on equivocation, then we can get the code length n needed. Also, from the secrecy requirement, we can fix N 1 . Once n and N 1 are fixed, to ensure that eventually, in slot k we will use a key from messages before time k − N 1 , the key buffer size should be ≥ CM N 1 n bits. Also, since in each slot, the key buffer length increases by nR s bits, the key buffer will have at least CM N 1 n bits after slot CMN1 Rs . In the finite buffer case eventually key buffer will overflow. We should loose only the latest bits arriving in any slot.
Comment 2:
We can obtain Shannon capacity even with strong secrecy. For this instead of using the usual wiretap coding of Wyner in the first minislot of each slot we use the extractor technique of [18] and [19] . Then I(W k,1 ; Z k,1 ) < ǫ instead of I(W k,1 ; Z k,1 ) ≤ nǫ for n large enough. Then from proof of Theorem 3.1, our coding-decoding scheme provides
IV. CONCLUSIONS In this paper we have achieved secrecy rate equal to the main channel capacity by using previous secret messages as key for transmitting the current message. This can be done while still retaining strong secrecy.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA Lemma 1:
The following holds
But
where
Also, because
Furthermore, since
Using the fact that
we can directly show that the right side equals zero. Let A denote the indices of the slots in which messages are transmitted which are used as keys for transmitting W k,2 and
where X ↔ Y ↔ Z denotes that {X, Y, Z} forms a markov chain. we have
where (a) follows from (19) , (b) follows since
From (14), (15), (18), (21),
We can similarly show that the other terms on the right side of (6) are also upper bounded by nǫ. This proves the lemma.
Lemma 2: We have
Proof: We have
Since W k,1 , . . . , W k−N1,1 is independent of W k,2 , . . . , W k−N1,2 , Z 1 , . . . , Z k−N1−1 , the first term on the right equals
(25) The second term 
The first term on the right is zero because (W k,2 ,W k−1,2 , . . . , W k−N1,2 ) is independent of (Z k,1 ,. . .,Z k−N1,1 ),(W k,1 , . . .,W k−N1 ) and Z 1 ,. . . Z k−N1−1 . Also since (W k,1 , . . . , W k−N1,1 ) and (Z k,1 , . . . , Z k−N1,1 ) are independent of the other random variables in the second term on the right side, this term equals 
and we have I( W 2 , Z 1 ) = 0 = I( W 2 ; Z 2 ),
and 
where (a) follow from (29), (b) follows from (30) (c) follows from W 1 ⊥ ( W 2 , Z 1 ). Also W 2 ⊥ Z 1 . Therefore
From (25), (26) and (32), we get the lemma.
